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Taming an Infatuation  
The previous chapters have explored the attractions of new technologies 
conceived as solutions to modern problems. From scientists and engineers to 
policy-makers, entrepreneurs and wider publics, this seemingly cool and 
rational conviction has seldom been recognized as being emotionally 
charged. Yet for each of these relevant social groups, the relationship with 
technical innovation has been akin to falling in love. New technologies 
represent irresistible appeals and inspire unquestioning acceptance. 
Technology’s responsiveness to our every immediate need, real or imagined, 
gains our implicit trust. Only in retrospect may such confidence seem naïve 
and misguided. Like in a human relationship, modern society and its 
technologies have become mutually dependent. The analogy suggests that a 
lasting relationship may require tempering the torrid love affair. 
Technologies and the solutions they give us are compelling, stimulating, and 
transformative. But can modern societies avoid the immediate gratifications 
of technological fixes in favour of stable bonds?  
Enduring Faith in Fixes  
This book adopts a historical perspective to explore how technological 
confidence has come to captivate modern society, but the last two chapters 
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track more recent unexpected outcomes that followed enthusiastic 
adoptions. 
Some side effects of major technologies are common knowledge today, but 
they are seldom investigated beyond their specific cases. For modern publics, 
technological solutions – particularly those just over the horizon – remain 
seductive.  
There are several interlinked reasons for this continuing popular 
support: the ongoing promotion of the paradigm by contemporary 
technological ad venturers, channelling the spirit of interwar technocrats 
and science fiction fans; innovating companies seeking new consumer 
markets for novel problem-solving products and promising an updated 
version of the postwar future; and media communications, both by 
traditional sources and by grassroots participants in social media, echoing 
and extending the hopes of those players. The economic power of 
consumerism drives governments, too, to conflate product innovation with 
social progress, and often with the assumption that technological change can 
be triggered and prepared for but not resisted. A more diffuse attraction is 
curiosity about yet unexplored human ambitions and the complementary 
motivations provided by fears: looming problems that compel reassuring 
solutions. In short, contemporary culture remains skewed towards 
technological optimism by the pressure of powerful social actors and their 
rhetoric of progress. Wrapped within this cozy worldview, the narrower 
confidence in technological fixes can nestle unquestioned.  
For over a century, a handful of compelling preachers have 
proselytized this shared faith. As discussed earlier, none of them shaped wide 
publics but each influenced distinct cohorts: Howard Scott for technocrats 
and early science fiction readers; Richard Meier for postwar academics and 
development agencies; Alvin Weinberg for American policy-makers and 
young engineers. There have been several figureheads since then.  
Steve Jobs (1955–2011), for example, promoted Apple Inc. as a 
channel of technological agency for human solutions. The company had 
captured two markets missed by the largest computer company of the 
period, which introduced its IBM Personal Computer (PC) for small 
businesses in 1981. Apple’s first success was as a supplier and inspiration for 
the embryonic amateur computing movement via the company’s Apple I 
(1976) and Apple II (1977) computers. Along with competitors Commodore 
and Tandy Radio Shack, the company attracted a generation of American 
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computer experimenters who wrote their own software and sometimes 
extended their computers with sensors and output devices. The Apple II 
proved popular not just among computer hobbyists but also in university 
research labs that traditionally had improvised equipment to conduct 
experiments rather than buying expensive and preconceived off-the-shelf 
devices. These “homebrew” creations (some, like the Apple I, emerging from 
the eponymous Homebrew Computer Club in Silicon Valley from the mid-
1970s) fitted their users’ individualistic needs and encouraged their builders 
to conceive them as generic problem-solving devices.1  
The second audience captured by Apple was composed of creators 
and artists from non-technical disciplines. The Apple Macintosh computer 
(1983), adapting elements of a point-and-click graphical user interface (GUI) 
conceived by engineers at the nearby Xerox Palo Alto Research Center 
(PARC), was touted as easy-to-use by non-programmers. An early television 
advertisement soothed:  
It’s more sophisticated, yet less complicated; it’s more powerful, yet less 
cumbersome; it can store vast amounts of yesterday or tell you what’s 
in store for tomorrow; it can draw a picture, or it can draw conclusions. 
It’s a personal computer from Apple, and it’s as easy to use as this 
[finger and mouse click]. Macintosh: the computer for the rest of us.2  
Its buyers included writers empowered by word-processing and desk-top 
publishing, and graphic artists enthused by mouse-directed painting and 
graphics software.  
These two subcultures – computer experimenters on the one hand 
and creative non-technologists on the other – briefly co-existed via such 
products but thereafter diverged. The Apple I computer had required savvy 
users to add a keyboard, power supply, and video monitor, and to program it 
in basic – a challenging set of demands for rank novices. By contrast, the 
Macintosh computer was notoriously “closed,” offering no output ports 
available to hobbyists to interface it with the outside world. Yet, for both 
subcultures, Apple spawned zealous supporters who identified the 
corporation with an ideology of personal liberation, conspicuous 
consumption, and technical progress.3  
Apple’s origins in the Bay Area south of San Francisco were shared 
with Stanford University and the burgeoning postwar technical culture of 
Silicon Valley, the collection of companies that has incubated generations of 
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electronics engineers, would-be entrepreneurs, and start-up companies. It 
was also the home of Richard Meier, who focused on technological 
approaches to problem-solving. This Californian enclave became the centre 
of popular technological faith in America. By contrast, MIT, its east coast 
academic counterpart in championing American innovation, had become 
more visibly associated with military contracts and corporate technologies. 
Californian products and spokespersons exported their credo of individual 
enablement internationally through companies such as Intel, Hewlett 
Packard, Google, Facebook, eBay, and Uber.4  
Perhaps because of these associations, the Bay Area has also nurtured 
another constituency having less obvious ties to technological confidence. 
Arguably, an important trigger for the exploding popularity of the 
counterculture of the 1960s was the freedom of speech and civil rights 
confrontations at the University of California, Berkeley, across the Bay from 
San Francisco, and the varied cultural options enabled by the pattern of 
population mobility of the west coast.5 California generally, and the Haight-
Ashbury district of San Francisco in particular, became a mecca for those 
seeking freer lifestyles and alternatives to “the establishment” – power-
holders then identified as government, law-enforcers, and corporations 
promoting conservative politics, peacetime militarization, and traditional 
social values supported largely by the older generations. In retrospect, this 
countercultural opposition appears to be directly antithetical to Alvin 
Weinberg’s technological fixes. As head of a national lab responsible for 
nuclear energy, Weinberg was then at the peak of his influence, advising 
presidential committees about technological means of waging war and 
defusing the likelihood of race riots, and beginning to lecture student 
audiences on engineering as a social tool.  
Nevertheless, the counterculture was a diverse and fluid movement. 
From it came Stewart Brand (1938–), an eclectic writer who had enduring 
influence in tracking the shifting flavour of shared technological concerns 
and enthusiasms. He became best known for The Whole Earth Catalog, a 
periodical that appealed to the individualistic and anti-hierarchical spirit of 
his generation and that he continued to adapt to new media and audiences 
over two decades.6 A patchwork quilt of design ideas, manual skills, 
inspirational reviews, practical philosophies, and commercially available 
resources, it collected themes that eventually intersected with the home 
computer movement and early online communications. His Catalog was 
oriented towards information-sharing and self-sufficiency with an amalgam 
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of do-it-yourself resources. It epitomized a countercultural engagement with 
independent tinkering. Before there was an internet, Brand and associates 
promoted the WELL (Whole Earth ’Lectronic Link, 1985), a dial-up bulletin 
board system allowing users to post and receive public messages and 
communicate via special-interest groups, amounting to an early 
implementation of a virtual community.7 In later publications, Brand 
increasingly enmeshed his ideas with commercial innovation and new 
technologies. He linked the east and west coast tech cultures with a 
journalistic account of the MIT Media Lab, which he identified as emblematic 
of work by technologists to invent the future through technology.8 Although 
his Catalog had begun with a clear stance against “government, big business, 
formal education, church,” Stewart Brand’s activities built bridges with each 
of these interests. For a time, he advised the governor of California and 
helped found a business consultancy, the Global Business Network, during 
the 1980s; his publications referenced academic research, particularly that 
associated with corporate and consumer interests; and his later 
environmental writing sought to address metaphysical themes through the 
demanding eyes of a technological rationalist. With his subtext of 
empowerment, Brand thus helped to proselytize and broaden technological 
faith in wider culture – at least west coast American culture.9  
The Momentum of Confidence  
Contemporary technological fixes are also promoted by our cultural 
attraction to novelty. Consumer culture, first established in North America 
but increasingly taken up worldwide since the late twentieth century, has 
been conditioned by new products and has made collective expectations of 
progress endemic. These cultural confidences have waxed and waned for 
specific technologies. Space flight, for example, arguably captures less 
popular enthusiasm today than it did over the preceding century. Interwar 
science fiction, followed by Cold War rocket programs and the Space Race, 
caused public fervour to peak with the Apollo missions to the moon, but 
interest fell with the subsequent Skylab, space shuttle, and international 
space station programs.  
These heroic initiatives were not portrayed to the general public as 
technological fixes: they did not aim or claim to solve immanent problems 
with a neat technical solution. However, they were certainly understood as 
technological fixes by successive American administrations. The earliest 
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upper-atmosphere aircraft and satellites carrying film cameras had been 
designed to short-circuit a looming political problem: public concerns about a 
“Missile Gap” with the Soviet Union. These experimental technologies, some 
unknown to the American public, had the covert purposes of identifying 
lagging American military progress and inhibiting Soviet dominance. In the 
same way, the subsequent space race equated technological progress with 
political ascendency. With the later diplomatic accommodations of nuclear 
downscaling and rising international cooperation, the promises of the space 
age began to evaporate.10  
More mundane contemporary issues nevertheless continue to evoke 
widespread technological faith and illustrate the enduringly popular appeal 
of technological novelty. A contemporary version is the promise of the “smart 
city.” Its claims are typical of technological fixes and breathtaking in their 
aspirations. Smart cities are an open-ended promise, envisaging technologies 
that will solve the problems of urban life, including traffic, public safety, and 
social well-being.  
Recall the characteristic attributes of a fix: claims about its 
simplicity and cleverness; its identification as a straightforward and 
deliberate technical solution to a social, political, economic, or cultural 
problem; its punctual focus on an immediate and local issue rather than 
a consideration of existing systems, social infrastructure, and human 
constraints; its identification of promised beneficiaries but neglect of 
potential harms and externalities; its requirement of expert 
implementation and citizen acceptance.  
The rhetoric of smart cities champions a variety of fixes for identified 
problems but has been sustained by enthusiasts seeking to implement their 
favoured technologies. “Smart” is loosely defined but hints at the assumed 
social benefits of information. The intended benefits are often disturbingly 
vague. It may mean an innovation that is either economically sustainable, 
resource-efficient, or responsive to the needs of city-dwellers. A common 
theme is technology to acquire and report urban conditions for stakeholders, 
commonly defined as local government, businesses, or mobile citizens. The 
most frequently discussed genre of solutions is integrated information and 
communications technologies. Smart cities would add a network of sensing 
devices, communication links, and control software to new or existing city 
developments. Integrated systems could predict congestion of roadways, 
public transport, and even sidewalks and take corrective actions. High-
efficiency streetlights could illuminate a pedestrian’s path and turn off to 
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save energy after they had passed; mobile devices could display optimal 
routes for pedestrians and identify nearby conveniences; fine-grained 
environmental conditions – smog, ultraviolet exposure, and weather – could  
 
Figure 8.1 Unassailable smart cities: reduced to simplistic rhetoric and imagery, 
what’s not to like?  
be reported, and avoided, at street level. The subtext of smart cities, like 
previous technological fixes, is that their innovations can be implemented 
with a net saving of human labour and complexity. Cities such as London, for 
instance, currently employ automatic cameras and ticketing systems to 
detect drivers entering the city and imposing “congestion charges,” a system 
that aims to avoid multiplying the bureaucracy of traffic police.11  
Integrating such useful innovations nevertheless relies on optimism 
about engineering design at the system-scale. Urban environments are 
sociotechnical ecosystems that evolve under the influence of disorganized 
forces; a genuinely smart city would have to be adaptable in the same way. 
More worryingly, the common experience of city management is generally 
poor. Consider the management of roadworks to locate and replace water 
and electricity services, in which separate city departments may scarcely be 
aware of each other’s activities. Such interdependent systems, created ad hoc 
over decades, tend to co-exist and piggy-back rather than being designed to 
cooperate productively. Of even greater concern is the maintenance of 
infrastructure. By contrast to some well-maintained cities, interstate rail and 
freeway networks have declined; bridges built during the 1930s have 
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increasingly failed owing to lack of monitoring, maintenance, and adaptation 
to traffic requirements, a key requirement of complex systems. At the city 
scale, unlike at the interstate level, there may be convergence of public 
attention, government responsiveness, and taxation mechanisms that sustain 
such visible networks, but these are essential social and political dimensions 
of the technical systems they sustain. As illustrated by the examples in 
chapters 6 and 7, human systems have repeatedly had to adapt to support 
clever fixes that were initially portrayed as wholly technological and 
straightforward.  
Another dimension of concern, as with earlier technological fixes, is 
the intended beneficiaries. A smart city could be optimized to promote the 
interests of drivers (e.g., by temporarily opening routes to make pedestrian 
or cycling traffic easier) or, quite distinctly, could promote the interests of 
civic government (e.g., identifying and containing disruptive protesters). 
Such competing interests have long been recognized. The overtly political 
dimensions of city governance were incorporated in the design of the wide 
radial arteries of Paris, the low-clearance parkways of New York State, and 
the wall that divided East and West Berlin, and can be expected to be more 
readily configurable in smart cities.12  
In common with other technological fixes, the promises of smart cities 
rely on enthusiastic promoters. A technology enthusiast who has promoted 
both space flight and urban solutions – attracting investors and ardent fans in 
the process – is Elon Musk (1971–). As an entrepreneur and technology 
promoter, Musk founded Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX, 2002), an 
American firm developing space vehicles as a commercial competitor to 
organizations such as NASA and the European Space Agency. The company’s 
vehicles gained attention for extending technical capabilities (notably vertical 
soft landings of a space vehicle on land and on a seaborne platform) and 
earned revenue by transporting payloads for government and commercial 
customers.  
Musk has also been noteworthy as co-founder of the electric car 
company Tesla Inc. He combined his two largest technology-demonstration 
projects by launching one of his cars on a SpaceX vehicle in 2018, making 
them the first two privately funded products to leave Earth’s orbit. Via such 
publicity coups, Musk is a notable proselytizer of technological faith. He has 
forecast private space flights for eventual settlement on Mars and potentially 
terraforming it for humans (a more extravagant promise than mere 
geoengineering of the Earth’s climate, described below) and imagines brain-
From Sean F. Johnston, Techno-Fixers: Origins and Implications of Technological Faith (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020) 
 
The Future for Fixing – 211 
 
computer interfaces to liberate human capabilities. He has promoted more 
down-to-earth conceptual solutions to urban problems, including high-speed 
transportation between cities via a passenger-carrying pod in an evacuated 
tube (a scheme dubbed the “Hyperloop”) and networks of underground 
tunnels for moving cars and people. Technological solutions, he claims, are 
generally best, but his hubris raises controversy along with his public profile. 
The Hyperloop, imagined as a ground-transport replacement or supplement 
for aircraft, airports, and railways, has been criticized as a sparse technical 
sketch that ignores complex human systems and their implications.13  
As detailed in previous chapters, entrepreneurial caution is generally 
a weak complement to enthusiasm and profit. Elon Musk and other 
contemporary technology adventurers spearhead popular enthusiasms and 
merge them with corporate aspirations by stimulating consumer anticipation 
and investor confidence. Other high-profile investors and advocates with 
varying degrees of technological hubris include businessman Richard 
Branson (1950–), CEO of Virgin Galactic; Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen 
(1953–2018) and executive Charles Simonyi (1948–); Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos 
(1964–); and Google executives Eric Schmidt (1955–), Ram Shriram (1956–), 
and Larry Page (1973–). Such speculation about private and corporate 
exploitation of the solar system threatens another century of unanticipated 
consequences. There is not yet national legislation to monitor and supervise 
such activities, a requirement of the Outer Space Treaty agreed between the 
USA, the UK, and the Soviet Union in 1967, and now subscribed to by 107 
countries.14  
Such visions, whether urban or extraterrestrial, flourish in a context of 
entrepreneurism and technological enthusiasm. Confidence in technological 
fixes becomes implicit: technology as a solution to as yet unidentified human 
problems is tacitly assumed. The rhetoric of progress shared across media by 
confident evangelists can encourage public acceptance as the default 
outcome.  
Men Like Gods: Imagining Global Repairs  
The scale of attention and infectious self-confidence displayed by space 
entrepreneurs is characteristic of other past and contemporary technological 
optimists and fixers. When H.G. Wells wrote his utopian novel Men Like Gods, 
he imagined a technological world that espoused collective wisdom without 
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political hierarchy. Unlimited knowledge and liberty – free discussion, free 
movement, and privacy – combined to create a rational communitarian 
society.15 Yet this sensitivity to both social and technological dimensions was 
unusual. Others have found such clarity of shared purpose either to be an 
unlikely outcome, on the one hand, or a trivially obvious benefit, on the other.  
Social anthropologist Edmund Leach explored similar themes in his Reith 
Lectures broadcast on BBC radio in 1968, which open with a provocative 
statement:  
Men have become like gods. Isn’t it about time that we understood our 
divinity? Science offers us total mastery over our environment and over 
our destiny, yet instead of rejoicing we feel deeply afraid. Why should 
this be? How might these fears be resolved?  
Leach noted that “we love our machines … Technical wizardry is just what 
makes life worth living, it is the badge of civilisation.” He noted that the 
natural and social sciences revealed regularities and insights, and 
consequently scientists and technologists could no longer be detached: they 
had a responsibility to apply their knowledge, while meticulously 
maintaining their connections with both nature and culture. His explorations 
were not prescriptive but, rather, suggested that science provided powers 
that had to be patiently absorbed and cautiously applied – hardly the 
practices of the modern world.16  
The same year, Stewart Brand’s first Whole Earth Catalog, subtitled 
Access to Tools, reduced these musings to a strapline and reoriented it as a 
motivation for his technological compendium:  
We are as gods and might as well get good at it … A realm of intimate, 
personal power is developing – power of the individual to conduct his own 
education, find his own inspiration, shape his own environment, and share 
his adventure with whoever is interested. Tools that aid this process are 
sought and promoted in the WHOLE EARTH CATALOG. 17 
The god-like power of adventurous technology was a theme familiar to 
professional technologists, too, and championed by Brand in his later writing. 
Moving from periodical editor to technology journalist to business 
consultant, Stewart Brand increasingly adopted the role of futurist and 
proselytizer. Founded in 1996, his Long Now Foundation aimed to encourage 
dialogue about long-term thinking, and his book Whole Earth Discipline, 
written a decade later, provides an early twenty-first-century take on 
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technological fixing into the deep future. The book is unabashedly optimistic 
about grand technological schemes as the only means of ensuring societal 
survival in the long term. It mutates his old strapline to “We are as gods and 
have to get good at it.” Brand describes his orientation as “scientific rigor, 
geoeconomic perspective, and an engineer’s bias, which sees everything in 
terms of solvable design problems,” a stance evoking Richard Meier’s focus a 
half-century earlier (chapter 3) but with Alvin Weinberg’s looser 
commitment to detail.18  
Brand identifies moralistic and rebellious environmentalists as his 
principal opponents and pragmatic technologists as allies: “Engineers are 
arriving who see any environmental problem neither as a romantic tragedy 
nor as a scientific puzzle but simply as something to fix.”19 The most 
ambitious but urgent of these hubristic fixes, he argues, is geoengineering. 
The pace of anthropogenic climate change is now so rapid, and so unlikely to 
be managed by conventional human approaches, that the global climate must 
be ameliorated “by adjusting the nature of the planet itself through large-
scale geoengineering.” This is a classic Weinbergian technological fix but one 
of unprecedented proportions. Understanding the fundamental nature of 
cli mate change, he suggests, is the wrong focus: we should concentrate 
instead either on ways of merely controlling the planet’s overall temperature 
or of limiting carbon dioxide emissions, prescribing a kind of global aspirin or 
antacid remedy instead of adoption of a healthier lifestyle. Alvin Weinberg 
himself had suggested the much more restrained, but still consequential, 
technological fix of wholesale adoption of nuclear power to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions as a major contribution to climate change.20  
Ideas for geoengineering fixes have been ingenious but highly contested. 
Two general options have been proposed: either to concentrate on 
temperature control by reducing the influx of sunlight or to reduce 
greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide and methane, which trap solar 
energy and thus contribute to global temperature rise. Solar radiation could 
be blocked, for example, by creating a cloudier atmosphere to reflect sunlight 
away from the earth. Cloud cover could be increased and brightened, for 
instance, by seeding the atmosphere with sulphur to increase the planetary 
reflectance (known as albedo enhancement). This is an ironic complement to 
the unintended pollution of twentieth-century skies by industrial by-
products. The sulphur might be distributed via commercial aircraft or shot 
from cannons, which could produce effects lasting weeks, or seeded in the 
stratosphere for longer-lasting effects. Alternatively, marine clouds could be 
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increased by unoccupied ocean-going ships, controlled by satellite and 
powered by the wind, spraying aerosol-sized droplets of seawater (figure 
8.2). Still other options for albedo enhancement include growing crops 
chosen for their high reflectance or painting the roofs of buildings white.21  
 
Figure 8.2 Optimistic repairs for the global greenhouse. Salter concept for aerosol-
generating ocean vessel to counteract climate change via cloud whitening and 
planetary cooling. Enthusiast Stewart Brand notes, “the vessel is incredibly cool 
looking.” Salter, Sortino, and Latham, “Sea-Going Hardware for the Cloud Albedo 
Method”; Brand, Whole Earth Discipline, 285. 
None of these schemes addresses the continuing rise of carbon dioxide 
caused by burning petroleum-based fuels, which would carry on making 
oceans more acidic and harming marine ecosystems. Thus, the other, 
somewhat deeper, approach to a technological fix for climate change involves 
con trolling the concentration of greenhouse gases. Here, too, tactics are 
inventive but uncertain. One controversial approach that has been trialled on 
a small scale is dumping iron particles to be consumed by microscopic 
marine species such as phytoplankton. This source of nutrients is intended to 
fertilize the seas, producing a bloom of algae that also absorb airborne 
carbon dioxide; when they die, the organisms carry their biologically bound 
carbon deep enough to decay slowly, keeping it trapped for decades or 
centuries.22 
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A seemingly more “natural” alternative is large-scale afforestation, 
planting millions of trees to absorb some or all of the carbon dioxide 
produced by human activities. A complement to such biological engineering 
is Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), a variety of schemes aiming to absorb, 
concentrate, and dis pose of carbon dioxide. As with other technological 
fixes, the putative solutions are seldom conceived as elements of 
sociotechnical systems that would need to be fitted into conventional human 
practices. Needless to say, each of these fuzzy options carries consequences – 
scientific, technological, economic, social, ethical, and cultural. New 
technological systems would have to be implemented within pre-existing 
systems comprising national laws, cultural practices, public support, and 
interdependent economies.23  
Reporting on such ideas, Brand supports their ambition by citing 
supporters more often than critics and by buttressing his arguments with 
science fiction stories that imagine terraforming planets for human benefit. 
Yet geoengineering is qualitatively unlike Alvin Weinberg’s proposals for 
global nuclear power. While he suggested that societies could make a 
transition to nuclear power generation, Weinberg was able to conceive of 
some of the profound consequences because they were already familiar on a 
smaller scale: the need for scaled-up uranium prospecting and refinement; 
the complementary requirement of replacing petrochemical fuels for vehicles 
with electricity; the need to replicate this transition in more and less affluent 
countries; wholesale adoption by populations, with predictable outcomes for 
those less able to adapt; and, not least, the problem of rapidly accumulating 
radioactive waste requiring its own fix. By contrast, geoengineering schemes 
offer experimental solutions on a planetary scale without precedents to guide 
design choices. Unlike terraforming the barren planets of science fiction, 
geoengineering would be experimenting with the only home that humans 
have. It would also magnify the problems of inequity. Some solutions will 
affect unlucky geographical regions, species, or vulnerable human 
populations (such as those inhabiting river deltas likely to face unpredictable 
flooding following climate manipulation). Thus, geoengineering suffers from 
the faults explored in chapter 7, being intrinsically over-confident, short-
sighted, risky, and unjust on a scale that technological fixes have not yet been. 
Independent of the scheme chosen, the manipulation of the physical and 
biological system of the biosphere – the largest and most complex machine 
known, to describe it from the perspective of technological fixers – is 
inherently dangerous. A Royal Society panel drawn mainly from prominent 
scientists and engineers not surprisingly focused on the science and 
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engineering rather than on the social and ethical dimensions of 
geoengineering. The members recommended that, while geoengineering 
deserved careful modelling, the numerous technical uncertainties made it 
worth considering only as an option of last resort.24 The putative solution 
falls back on Weinberg’s original notion of the quick fix: geoengineering is an 
emergency measure borne of desperation, in which we have no time to 
evaluate consequences.  
It is worth emphasizing that the proponents of geoengineering have 
seldom analyzed their schemes holistically. The social, political, and 
economic side effects are usually compartmentalized as externalities. As with 
other cases of technological fixes there are other human options. These 
include actions that are already familiar: legislation to limit or prohibit 
carbon dioxide production from power plants and vehicles; taxation to 
discourage environmentally harmful activities or commerce; social initiatives 
to encourage new behaviours; ethical teachings to alter understandings of 
collective harm and responsibility; dietary changes to scale down the 
consumption of meat and milk (ruminant digestion being a significant source 
of methane). Operating more locally and reversibly than planetary 
engineer ing, these tactics may have advantages in trialling reversible 
options and could be argued to more faithfully ally science, technology, and 
society than do bold geoengineering schemes.25  
But a second optimistic technology urged by Brand is biotechnology, 
especially via genetic modification. His scenario of looming crisis (in this 
case, the Malthusian crisis of insufficient food supplies as climate change 
reduces arable land) argues for quick fixes out of necessity, but he 
emphasizes the positive appeal of optimistic and daring technological 
solutions.  
Genetic engineering is qualitatively different from geoengineering and 
less readily categorized as a mere technological fix. It is a scientific field that 
has progressed over decades of international research. By contrast, 
geoengineering arguably represents a spectrum of half-baked technologies 
cobbled together from the worst traditions of engineering repair. Genetic 
engineering has become positively associated with human health, which 
often carries the seal of popular approval for new technologies. For example, 
Dolly the sheep (1996–2003), now stuffed and on display at the National 
Museum of Scotland in Edinburgh near where she was raised, represented an 
aspirational use of genetic engineering. Although Dolly was the first mammal 
cloned from mature body cells, a procedure still deemed abhorrent and 
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internationally prohibited for humans, the longer-term goal was to develop 
techniques for genetically modifying animals to produce milk as medicine. 
Sheep or cows, for instance, would be modified by incorporating human 
genes into their DNA to produce important proteins that are lacking in 
human victims of genetically inherited illnesses such as cystic fibrosis and 
haemophilia. The redesigned farm animals, conceived as living 
pharmaceutical factories, would supply such proteins in their milk to treat 
what researchers hope eventually to be a long list of genetic illnesses. A 
growing variety of other experimental cloning techniques could potentially 
be used to correct genetically inherited diseases or to develop other 
therapies. Since the 1990s, in fact, most insulin production around the world 
has converted from the former method – extraction of the hormone from cow 
and pig pancreases, a reliably sourced by-product of the meat industry – to a 
spectrum of genetically engineered variants manufactured in pharmaceutical 
factories. Developed in research contexts that typically receive scrutiny by 
medical and licensing authorities and wider publics, these current and 
potential technological fixes have often been viewed as comparable in 
principle to other, more conventional ones such as radiation therapy for 
cancer or heart-valve replacement surgery: risky for patients but relatively 
free of potential societal harms.26  
Nevertheless, Stewart Brand’s promotion of genetic engineering 
considers a more contentious domain: genetically modified (GM) foods and 
species to provide resources of wider human utility. In the most urgent form 
of the argument, GM is touted as a technological fix for chronic food 
shortages that result from climate change. An even more contentious version 
suggests its application for creating species better adapted to deteriorating 
environments (the most dramatic of which is the potential modification of 
the human species, as discussed below).  
Genetically modified foods are a large and growing class of products 
created by a variety of genetic technologies. The best known and most 
popular have been foods that solve relatively minor and non-urgent 
problems of food production, transport, and consumer appeal. An early 
example was the Flavr Savr tomato, approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in 1994. The tomato was genetically engineered to 
improve transport robustness and shelf-life while retaining a natural colour. 
The product failed commercially not because of identified environmental 
dangers or consumer fears but because of conventional side effects: no 
practical saving in harvesting or transport and unattractive taste. It proved to 
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be an unnecessary solution to a non-existent problem. More broadly, genetic 
modification of consumer foodstuffs and animal stocks has introduced new 
technologies requiring careful evaluation but seldom qualitatively distinctive 
improvements. For this domain and its interest groups, the motivation for 
quick technological fixes is consequently more difficult to defend.27  
Other GM foods have been developed to improve agricultural yield 
with the aim of reducing food costs. Genetically modified maize, for example, 
can be designed to be drought-resistant (e.g., Monsanto DroughtGard™, 
licensed by China in 2013) or to contain proteins that are toxic for certain 
insects. Each GM variant carries distinctive implications. For instance, 
adoption of herbicide-tolerant genetic varieties is practised in conjunction 
with higher herbicide spraying, and excessive use of these chemicals carries 
specific consequences for ecosystems. The most recognized side effect is 
herbicide resistance, as weeds rapidly evolve to develop tolerance and 
require ever-greater quantities of more toxic herbicides in an unsustainable 
cycle. These chemical treatments increase environmental pollution and 
potentially affect animal species.28  
Similarly, insect-resistant GM hybrids threaten ecosystems in large-
scale plantings. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) consequently 
imposed regulations to require farmers to plant unmodified maize in nearby 
areas to prevent eradicating the vulnerable target strains of the insect pests 
entirely, thereby seeking to delay the inevitable rise of GM maize-resistant 
varieties. This is a typical example of a traditional human fix to counter a 
technological side effect: a legal correction to control over-enthusiastic use of 
the technological solution in order to reduce later negative outcomes. As with 
seemingly innocuous additives to plastics discovered to have problems 
decades after their introduction, opponents of GM maize challenge over-
optimism and complacency about unsuspected side effects. Among 
possibilities are sensitivity of other species to the proteins in the maize, an 
important concern given the ubiquity of maize in animal feed and human 
food products. Another is so-called “gene flow,” in which genes from the 
hybrid may transfer to other species of crop with yet uninvestigated 
consequences.  
Arguments have been made, however, for technological fixes for food 
supply to benefit more urgent and needy audiences, notably populations 
starved of adequate and nutritious food. A stronger case closer to Stewart 
Brand’s theme has been made for “golden rice.” Conceived as a genetically 
modified variety of rice designed to synthesize beta-carotene, golden rice 
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aims to counter the lack of dietary vitamin A for deprived populations, much 
in the way that vitamin-enriched flour was introduced in North America and 
Britain during the Second World War to relieve vitamin B deficiency. Golden 
rice is a classic technological fix that seeks to bypass political, social, and 
cultural routes via a speedy technical innovation. Vitamin A deficiency is 
associated with inadequate dietary variety and has been treated by aid 
agencies via high-concentration oral supplements or injections. The pro - 
mise by promoters of golden rice is that it will supply a simpler, wholly 
technical solution to chronic malnutrition, even though it requires an amount 
of production, distribution, and monitoring comparable to that of earlier 
supplements. Critics argue that the golden rice solution also avoids 
addressing deeper socio-economic reasons for poor nutrition and, 
consequently, defuses action to remedy more pervasive faults in human 
systems. They note that it threatens grassroots solutions such as cooperative 
cultivation and distribution of conventional dietary sources of vitamin A such 
as sweet potatoes, fruit, and leafy vegetables. As with the cases explored in 
chapter 6, proponents have tended to overlook the traditional social and 
economic supports needed to make golden rice and other dietary 
supplements viable: a network of manufacturing, distribution, and, not least, 
external funding and research to make this stop-gap fix more sustainable. 
Opponents criticize the potential for the consequent dependence of poor 
countries on corporate products supplied for profit. In response, proponents 
have suggested that (with government funding or corporate largesse) golden 
rice could be made available for free to subsistence farmers, and free licences 
could be offered to developing countries, a plan that is nevertheless likely to 
consolidate the status of disempowered populations and countries. There are 
also purely technical issues with golden rice: current varieties, none yet 
manufactured commercially, supply insufficient dietary vitamin A for 
adequate health, and it is unclear whether cultivation and consumption could 
become wide - spread. Stewart Brand has characterized “anti-genetic 
engineering environmentalists” attempting to “frighten African nations” as 
responsible for the difficulties in promoting golden rice and cites the lack of 
identified health problems as sufficient evidence to justify its rapid uptake.29  
Wider arguments against genetic modification as a routine category of 
technological fix centre on the issues of complexity and risk. Biological and 
ecological systems are more sophisticated than human-designed systems, 
and, consequently, genetically modified organisms should be expected to 
evince unanticipated outcomes more frequently or dramatically than 
human made technologies. This is a familiar source of problems in large 
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systems and calls for meticulous attention at the design stage. The concerns 
about risk vary across the type of genetic engineering considered. For 
example, those that are contained – such as animal cloning and gm hormone 
production in factory environments – present less environmental risk than 
does the propagation of GM crops or gm insects in the open environment, 
where they may potentially interact with other species in unpredictable 
ways. And unlike human engineering of hardware and software, some 
biotechnologies can self-propagate and evolve in their new environments, 
resisting containment and control.30  
Critics cite the “precautionary principle” as a social and ethical brake 
on innovation for such engineering systems that can rapidly produce 
unpredictable effects. It calls on decision makers to establish that a change 
will be safe before it is implemented. This is the complement of typical 
legislative regulation, which bans (some) products proven to be harmful. 
Although there is a regulatory system to assess food and drug safety, such 
policy mechanisms attend to a relatively narrow range of potential harms. 
The term entered usage in the 1980s and since then has become common in 
environmental dialogue, particularly in relation to adverse effects from gm 
technologies. The principle critically connects innovation, benefit, and risk, 
expressing broad sensitivities that were uncommon during the twentieth 
century and that remain largely outside legal frameworks today.31  
Both geoengineering and non-medical genetic engineering, 
emphasizing the technological and scientific dimensions of these subjects, 
have encouraged public deference to their experts as reliable social and 
cultural guides. A prominent lay representative for this contemporary hubris, 
Stewart Brand argues that this is appropriate: “environmentalists do worst 
when they get nervous about where science leads, as they did with genetic 
engineering.” His implication is that science and technology provide the tools 
for expressing human ideals and should not be constrained or redirected by 
cultural values, political philosophy, or ethics. Indeed, he suggests that 
rational decision making must be purely scientific and that science should be 
depoliticized and utilitarian. Thus, governments should refrain, for example, 
from adopting policies too hastily about banning plastic bags or rejecting 
nuclear power because their benefits versus harms can be assessed 
scientifically, unambiguously, and unromantically. Brand’s words echo 
Howard Scott and the interwar Technocrats: “Instead of yelling ‘Stop!,’ 
engineers figure out what the problem is, and then make it go away. They 
don’t have to argue about what is wrong; they show what is right.”32  
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More Than Human: Technological Fixes for Our Species  
This seat-of-the-pants forecasting plays to our collective optimisms about 
technological possibilities. Brand suggests that human achievements will 
outpace our problems:  
How about, say, two hundred years from now? If we and our technology 
prosper, humanity by then will be unimaginably capable compared to 
now, with far more interesting things to worry about than some easily 
detected and treated stray radioactivity somewhere in the landscape … 
Extrapolate to two thousand years, ten thousand years. The problem 
doesn’t get worse over time, it vanishes over time.33  
This long-term perspective seems to distinguish it from the typical 
short-term and short-sighted technological quick fix. It expresses the frontier 
ethic and science fiction optimism of constant expansion. Humans are the 
most creative of species, it argues; space travel and colonization of new 
worlds is merely a continuation of our zeal to discover, conquer, and expand. 
Exploration and colonization of new worlds is human nature, as is 
outgrowing old environments. According to this perspective, sustainability is 
less important than curiosity-seeking and innovation. It hints that the 
journey, not the ultimate destination, is what matters, and imperfect 
technological fixes along the way are part of the trip, to be experienced but 
ultimately left behind.  
Yet this complacent long-term vision can be decomposed into 
numerous individual fixes adopted unreflectively, each with worthy 
aspirations but shallow short-term attentions. Instead of focusing on 
immediate social, political, or cultural issues, it urges technological 
improvements to satisfy distant hopes and dreams for entire nations, for the 
planet, or even for the human species. Such grand and hazy goals, as 
suggested by the case of geoengineering, nevertheless carry numerous 
awkward details that may tend to accumulate, rather than vanish, over time. 
At risk is intergenerational justice: storing up a legacy for future generations 
to sort out. But Brand’s optimism argues that, from a distance, human 
progress through technology looks rosy and obvious; his opponents might 
counter that, averaged over the past century, new technologies have 
implanted systemic problems having slow gestations and still unexplored 
consequences.  
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In the early twenty-first century, the most emblematic of these grand 
ambitions has attracted various labels, notably “transhumanism.” The term 
was coined as early as 1957 by Julian Huxley (1887–1975) – biologist, first 
director of UNESCO, and brother of novelist Aldous Huxley. He used it 
interchangeably with “scientific humanism” to describe the imperative 
created by “new knowledge amassed in the last hundred years” that has 
“defined man’s responsibility and destiny – to be an agent for the rest of the 
world in the job of realizing its inherent potentialities as fully as possible.” As 
with proponents of technological fixes, Huxley saw this as a task for a cadre 
of techno-scientific elites, “a few of us human beings … appointed managing 
director of the biggest business of all, the business of evolution.”34 At the 
heart of the modern expression of transhumanism is the enthusiastic 
identification of new technologies as dramatic means of altering human 
capacities. The idea of liberating or unlocking greater “humanness” via 
technologies is an ironic twist. Transhumanism taps into aspirations for 
personal health and happiness, the most optimistic and widely accepted 
domain of technological fixes. Yet it carries the potential not merely of fixes 
for personal health but also more ethically suspect extensions: the goal of 
achieving technologically enhanced communities via genetic engineering, 
bio-technical alterations, or retrofitting.35  
This technological enhancement, proponents argue, will be 
transcendent, liberating individuals and empowering collective human 
progress at an un precedented pace. Academic philosopher Steve Fuller has 
labelled the theme of re-engineering our species “Humanity 2.0” and argues 
that new technological capabilities will inevitably alter our collective notions 
of what it means to be human. In effect, technological innovations will 
supersede or revamp religion, philosophy, and human traditions. This driving 
of human capabilities by technological agents is the technological fix writ 
large, with the most competent experts as directors.36  
The notions of transhumanism did not develop de novo but drew on 
the rising technological faith of the twentieth century. After the Second World 
War, medical interventions became dramatically more powerful. Cardiac 
surgery repaired and replumbed the heart and arteries, and experimental 
heart transplants began two decades later. Replacement of body parts – 
beginning with corneal transplants from cadavers and kidney transplants 
between identical twins – became routine, and failing organs were 
supplemented or replaced: by the 1960s, heart-lung machines during cardiac 
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surgery, dialysis machines for periodic treatments of chronic kidney disease, 
and wearable heart pacemakers were widely employed.  
Surgical alterations also became feasible and increasingly available 
after the war. Plastic surgery repaired not only injured or congenitally 
malformed features but also enabled cosmetic enhancements as elective 
surgery. It is notable that these new powers faced contemporary criticism 
but gradually became culturally acceptable. Facelifts, breast enhancement, 
and hair trans plants rose in popularity first in southern California (aided by 
the economic motivation of employment in the entertainment industries) and 
later in other regions. More recently, consumer technologies of body 
modification have abounded: liposuction and implants, bariatric surgery, skin 
abrasion, Botox injections, teeth whitening procedures, and muscle 
stimulators. These possibilities have revolutionized long human traditions of 
adopting prosthetic aids such as artificial legs, dentures, and hairpieces, 
moving them from external functional or cosmetic additions to permanent 
elective choices now associated with personal expression and lifestyle. 
Surely, argue proponents of transhumanism, these powers to improve 
humans will continue to expand indefinitely.37  
The theme is hardly new. These new bodily options, rapidly identified 
as commodities for affluent middle-class consumers, inherited on a personal 
scale the hopes and dreams of science fiction for humanity as a whole. Similar 
zeal for improving human physiology and intellect had been explored in the 
golden age of science fiction through the mid-twentieth century. Isaac 
Asimov’s I, Robot series of novels imagined how robots could extend human 
power while remaining dedicated to human needs; Arthur C. Clark’s 
screen play for 2001: A Space Odyssey depicted evolutionary development 
from apes to super-human intelligences tightly coupled to technological 
powers. As explored in chapter 5, science fiction and popular technological 
forecasts later converged. A 1965 Our New Age Sunday comic strip by 
Athelstan Spilhaus promised: “By 2016, man’s intelligence and intellect will 
be able to be increased by drugs and linking human brains directly to 
computers!”38  
The theme of intellectually superior intelligences moved more 
assuredly from science fiction to forecasting with the writings of Vernor 
Vinge (1944– ), an academic computer scientist and science fiction writer. In 
1993 he suggested that the rapid progress in computing would lead to a point 
in the foreseeable future that he labelled the “technological singularity.” After 
this point, forecast by proponents as sometime during the present century, 
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human intellectual capabilities would be superseded by artificial intelligence 
(AI), threatening to leave humans increasingly far behind. This pessimistic 
view about being replaced by artificial intelligences is sometimes called 
“posthumanism.” Inventor and entrepreneur Ray Kurzweil argues instead 
that human and artificial intelligence could merge, inducting an epoch of 
exponentially increasing abilities and transcendence beyond biological 
limitations. Kurzweil, in fact, had a track record in inventing devices that 
could be seen both as contemporary technological fixes and as illustrations of 
the transhumanist route, commercializing some of the first text-to-speech 
synthesizers, print-to-speech reading machines for the blind, and commercial 
speech recognition software. Critics have argued that predictions of 
super intelligences are as simplistic as the fantasies of the previous 
generation, which foresaw domed cities and space colonies around the 
corner: many of the technological forecasts could be pursued with enough 
resources and collective will, but few of the forecasters attempted to explore 
how society would co-evolve with them. Neglecting how complex 
sociotechnical systems are likely to adapt to technological perturbations is a 
common failing of naïve forecasting and futurism.39  
For non-optimists, the singularity seems to represent the worst 
outcome of technological fixes: the dramatically unpredictable and 
uncontrollable consequence of short-sighted technological innovations. The 
transhumanist vision displays a hubristic faith in technology as the means of 
human transcendence, but it is peculiarly myopic about how human societies 
and individuals would be involved.40 For technological optimists, however, 
the progress towards transhumanism can be charted by contemporary 
achievements and near-term developments. Among the best-case examples 
of transformative technologies are electronics and computing, which have 
improved exponentially in memory capacity and computational speed in 
recent decades. First identified in 1965 by Gordon Moore, then research and 
development director of Fairchild Semiconductors and later head of Intel 
Corporation, the density of transistors on integrated circuits was roughly 
doubling every couple of years. This empirical technological improvement 
has been christened “Moore’s law,” with proponents like Kurzweil suggesting 
that it is indicative of a wider acceleration of human progress. The promise is 
not acknowledged by all. Critics note that the historical trend of 
improvement in computing hardware is slowing and is ultimately limited by 
physics; that some of the continuing improvements have been driven by 
narrow technical criteria and industry goal-setting rather than more rapid 
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innovation; and that software tends to bloat and slow computation in the 
opposite way, and so generates a much more limited net social gain.41  
A futurist and writer with a longer track record in predicting social 
effects of technology was Alvin Toffler (1929–2016). As a White House 
correspondent during the late 1950s and scenario writer for IBM, Xerox, and 
AT&T during the 1960s, he gained familiarity with the practices of American 
business, government, and technology firms. His 1970 book Future Shock 
captured growing public concerns about the pace of technological change 
(much as the Technocrats had done during the Great Depression), and his 
subsequent book The Third Wave a decade later focused on his forecasts at 
the beginning of the “Information Age.” Toffler was a technological 
determinist, seeing new technologies as causing overwhelming disruptions 
for which social adaptation was the solution. His ideas about “anticipatory 
democracy” influenced politicians across party lines, including Democrat Al 
Gore (1948–) and Republican Newt Gingrich (1943–). Toffler’s vision 
permeated the Congressional Clearing House on the Future created in 1976 
and later co-chaired by Gore and Gingrich. Toffler’s 1995 sequel to The Third 
Wave included an effusive foreword by Gingrich, then speaker of the House of 
Representatives; and, as vice-president during the Clinton administration 
from 1993to 2001, Gore championed government action to adapt US society 
to the internet. Toffler’s ideas were also received positively by the Chinese 
government from the 1980s.42  
Yet predicting the future is notoriously inaccurate, and the economic 
drivers of innovation further complicate forecasting. In a cultural 
environment primed to expect progress, company investment and academic 
careers increasingly depend on promises of transformative technologies as 
much as on actual results. This bias, portraying potential progress while 
ignoring wider outcomes, reinforces the culture of technological fixes.  
The case of nanotechnology, a forthcoming field according to some 
transhumanists, illustrates the prevailing hyperbole of unrealistic optimism, 
pop ular faith, and solutions-in-search-of-a-problem.43 The field was 
promoted in part by discovery of a new class of molecules resembling the 
geodesic domes popularized by Buckminster Fuller and, consequently, 
named “fullerenes.” Investigating these materials opened new directions for 
scientific research and engineering at the molecular level, or nanoscale. The 
term “nanotechnology” is consequently a catch-all and has described 
imagined science fiction scenarios of micro-machines assembled on the 
atomic scale to reproduce themselves or merely new formulations of 
From Sean F. Johnston, Techno-Fixers: Origins and Implications of Technological Faith (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020) 
 
The Future for Fixing – 226 
 
powders (such as fullerenes) applied to new problems. Nanomaterials have 
been touted by rebranded divisions of pharmaceutical companies, the 
materials industry, and semiconductor firms. Hundreds of start-up firms, 
funded by industry speculators, have proposed applications such as tissue 
engineering and regenerative medicine, more readily absorbed drug 
therapies, and carbon nanotubes instead of silicon for microelectronic 
devices. A Royal Society of Chemistry publication identified the potential for 
over 120 diverse applications of the foreseeable future, ranging from 
medicine to environmental remediation, and to materials that improve on 
nature. Transhumanists are even more optimistic, arguing that technology 
integration at the nanoscale is a key element for the improved human of the 
future. Enhancements might include nanobots providing therapies cell by 
cell; nanoparticle-strengthened implants to replace or strengthen bone; 
molecular-scale biosensors to detect and regulate body systems. “Bionics” 
(biological electronics) might improve human hearing and vision or 
supplement strength with artificial muscles, as imagined in the television 
series The Six Million Dollar Man. Even more importantly, proponents of 
nanotechnology hope that eventually it will allow the interconnection of 
brains to electronics, a development that might allow boosting, re-
engineering, or even replacing neuron-based intelligence.44  
Such bold claims of miniaturizing and revolutionizing all current 
technological competences launched an unassailable wave of unrealistic 
optimism. As with the enthusiastic corporate and cultural adoption of plastics 
a half-century earlier, the wholesale application of nanotechnology makes 
unanticipated outcomes likely and the precautionary principle relevant.  
 Figure 8.3 Previewing the future at a conference covering “Biomedical Engineering, 
Medicine and Pharmaceuticals, Life Sciences, Cardiology, Cancer … and Nano 
Cosmetics.”  
is the essence of their aims: technology would be transformed from an 
efficient fix for traditional human problem-solving into the basis for an 
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endlessly improvable human existence. The vision transcends even popular 
science fiction scenarios. The Star Trek vision of enlightened humans wisely 
managing their futuristic technologies is replaced by dreams of enhancement, 
which bypass outmoded cultures and technical limitations and disregard 
moral convictions.47  
The transhumanist perspective, not merely placing technology at the 
centre of modern society but also identifying it as the basis for redesigning 
humanity, echoes earlier analogs. Previous chapters chronicle the confidence 
and enthusiasm of technology promoters through the twentieth century as 
providers of well-being, while noting that many of their inventions had 
belatedly negative societal effects. The proselytizers among the technological 
fixers – notably the American Technocrats and Alvin Weinberg – argued for 
the power of planned technical innovations to directly address or detour 
around human problems. By contrast, transhumanism takes a different tack 
between technology, society, and human values. Its attitude exaggerates 
twentieth-century confidences. Hubristic and self-defining, it identifies 
technological powers as deterministic and dedicates little attention to the 
social consequences of enhanced humans in wider society. Transhumanism 
at tempts to argue that human problems, at least for the privileged cohort of 
adopters, will evaporate as new technological powers sweep forward. A more 
direct intellectual genealogy can be traced to eugenics; indeed, Julian Huxley, 
the first to define the aims of transhumanism, was a leader of the eugenics 
movement and president of the British Eugenics Society between 1959 and 
1962. Emerging in the 1880s, eugenics argued that the human species could 
be improved by scientifically managing human reproduction. Supporters of 
eugenics did not seek to enhance humanity beyond a presumed God given 
limit, but they sought to prevent the dilution of these “superior” traits by 
“inferior” inherited characteristics. The pseudoscience became popular 
across the political spectrum at the turn of the twentieth century and in 
countries across Europe, Asia, and the Americas. In 1915, for instance, the 
Panama-Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco included exhibits 
on eugenics supporting its theme of the advancement of civilization.48  
Organizations and governments implemented bureaucracies based on 
eugenic policies. The technical details of intentional selection of suitable 
parents varied from country to country through the interwar period and 
beyond. Immigration criteria for the United States were designed to filter 
particular countries and ethnic groups. A combination of legislation, public 
health administration, and popular attitudes in several countries caused 
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individuals judged to be mentally deficient or mentally ill to be sterilized. 
More widely still, individuals with physical disabilities or inherited diseases 
such as deafness were discouraged from marrying. In each country, public 
opinion largely supported and deferred to expert views.49  
The social side effects of eugenics hint at more exaggerated 
consequences for transhumanism, which seeks to create superior humans 
but via unspecified selection processes. Neoliberals might suggest that the 
lucky beneficiaries should gain their privileged access to body form and 
intelligence via the mechanisms of market supply and demand, and draw 
upon their rapidly rising purchasing power; progressive transhumanists 
might suggest that governments would ensure their citizens’ rights to 
enhancement; more nationalistic regimes might identify such enhancement 
as crucial to international competitiveness. In any case, there would be 
disparity between haves and have-nots. This would be temporary at best and 
certain to worsen di visions between affluent and poor countries, or 
technology-privileged and technology-deprived populations. A more 
fundamental issue first faced by eugenicists, though, was determining 
superior and inferior traits. Their definitions tended to be circular and to be 
blind to social presumptions: the “fittest” were those in the upper echelons of 
society because their privileged social positions reflected their “superior” 
breeding. In a similar way, transhumanists may tend to favour like-minded 
(and like-bodied) individuals, introducing a selection bias and consequent 
social inequalities. In an imagined future world with powerful genetic 
engineering technologies, infirmities might be prevented or corrected, 
leading to a more uniformly able and perhaps widely agreed “superior” 
population but exacerbating the “inferior” status of those unlucky enough to 
be deprived of it. Warnings about this morally problematic brave new world 
ushered in by technological faith is not novel, having been raised in 1932 by 
Julian Huxley’s brother, Aldous.50  
Such sought technological powers exaggerate the problems of 
technological fixes discussed in chapter 7. Techno-fixers, eugenicists, and 
transhumanists adopt narrow perspectives: identifying particular problems, 
focusing on distinct time scales, and attending to specific audiences. They 
consistently fail to recognize the entwined human systems through which 
society operates. Instead, they may trade off social cohesiveness for 
outcomes favouring other parameters. Experts, generally identified as 
technological enthusiasts, are judged unproblematically to be the appropriate 
implementers, adopters, and managers of their schemes, thus short-circuiting 
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democratic participation. It is not difficult to appreciate that this privileged 
perspective systematically disfavours other human contexts and non-human 
environments.  
Imagined Intentional Futures: Irresponsible Innovation or 
Redirected Ambitions?  
The promises and proselytizers explored in this chapter reveal the ongoing 
conviction of technological faith in modern society. Retaining a historical 
perspective, it is reasonable to trace the exploration and critiques of 
alternative paradigms. Can more responsible innovation replace over-
confident steps in the dark when considering new technologies? Cautious 
technological innovation has not been popular over the past century. The 
widely expressed concerns voiced during the Victorian era about the effects 
of industrialization became less frequent in the Machine Age. However, as 
explored in chapter 6, some technological choices were recognized belatedly 
as blunders and prompted more general critiques and alternatives. These 
analyses argued that adoption of new technologies tended to overlook social 
and environmental considerations at the design change, neglected negative 
outcomes, and often overtly traded off side effects in favour of economic 
interests.  
In a culture increasingly attentive to local and measurable 
improvements, longer-term inadequacies were less noticed. Such short-
termism has been attacked, for example, by political scientist Steven Teles, 
who describes US social policy as a “kludgeocracy.” He suggests that policy-
makers generally opt for imperfect fixes rather than for fundamental 
reforms.51 His neologism has a technological origin, coming from the 
computing term “kludge,” a cobbled-together fudge of software fixes that gets 
around an immediate problem but more often than not makes the software 
more difficult to maintain. The growing usage of his term suggests how far 
technological methods have infiltrated traditional social and political 
approaches, and how problematic they are. The technique was at the heart of 
Alvin Weinberg’s proposal of technological fixes for government policy-
making.  
On a broader and more positive scale, analysts outside “the 
establishment” have critiqued its growing reliance on technological solutions 
and offered long-term alternatives. Among the most important have been 
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environmental and political philosophers Arne Naess, Murray Bookchin, and 
Ernst Schumacher.52 As introduced in chapter 7, Naess discussed two broad 
configurations of environmental consciousness: the concerns of what he 
identified as “shallow ecology” and “deep ecology,” respectively. His tracing 
of shallow thinking maps onto the solutions favoured by supporters of 
engineering fixes. This ad hoc approach remains the most popular 
engagement with environmental problems and, as might be expected, has 
collected a random assortment of ready fixes and adopters. Stewart Brand 
has vaunted so-called “Bright Green” tactics to address environmental 
problems case by case. Coined by writer Alex Steffen in 2003, the approach 
asserts that innovative technologies provide the keys to environmental 
sustainability, provided that political and economic accommodations 
encourage them.53  
Naess identified this technology-oriented approach as inherently 
misguided. Energy-saving appliances, on the one hand, are a great 
improvement over the wasteful devices of past decades. Yet they may, on the 
other hand, encourage consumers to continue to buy, and eventually discard 
and recycle, even more such “labour-saving devices”; we may ask whose 
labour is being saved. Similarly, the installation of “eco-friendly” light bulbs, 
or participation in Earth Day events, may encourage individuals to feel that 
they are positively contributing to sustainability while leaving the 
preponderance of their lifestyle unquestioned and intact. Naess proposed his 
“deep ecology” as a more principled and holistic perspective. Technologies, 
he argued, are as likely to create negative as positive effects, and so the 
choice of technology must consider its social, cultural, and economic 
ramifications.54  
Murray Bookchin challenged these sensitivities and solutions, arguing 
that Naess’s approach identified the appropriate cultural currents but 
re quired a more consistent approach that fundamentally reconceived 
society. Both, nevertheless, had similar criticisms of technology. Some 
deleterious environmental aspects of technology, they argued, relate to how 
problems and solutions are framed and addressed: typically, affluent 
present-day populations are favoured, and other interests are neglected. 
More pointedly, Naess and Bookchin criticized technological fixes as 
dangerously seductive: employing technology as a shortcut to bypass deeper 
social corrections, they noted, makes societal inequities that much harder to 
eradicate.  
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Their critiques and solutions map neatly onto the ideas of their 
contemporary, Ernst Schumacher. A British economist who spent most of his 
career as economic advisor to the country’s National Coal Board, Schumacher 
spent a period in Burma, an experience that had suggested to him that the 
distinctive values of human lifestyles could not be reduced to modern 
Western criteria. His use of the phrase “Buddhist economics” highlighted his 
view that quality of life in modern societies required a more holistic and 
spiritual sense of fulfilment. Schumacher’s influential book Small Is Beautiful 
argued for this broader perspective on social, environmental, and economic 
issues. As suggested by the title, he presented the case for rescaling human 
activities to better serve human and environmental needs. Both modern 
economics and technological development, he argued, need to be recast. 
Schumacher identified two flawed models of technology: “the super-
technology of the rich,” on the one hand, and “the primitive technology of 
bygone ages, but at the same time much simpler, cheaper and freer,” on the 
other. The first was appealing but also wasteful and poorly distributed. The 
second was back-breaking and inefficient but readily available. Drawing on 
the work of Mohandas Gandhi, he defined “intermediate technology” between 
these two extremes:  
The technology of production by the masses, making use of the best of 
modern knowledge and experience, is conducive to decentralisation, 
compatible with the laws of ecology, gentle in its use of scarce 
resources, and designed to serve the human person instead of making 
him the servant of machines … One can also call it self-help technology, 
or democratic or people’s technology – a technology to which 
everybody can gain admittance and which is not reserved to those 
already rich and powerful.55  
His perspective mirrored views growing in the counterculture and 
provided a coherent alternative view of how morally defensible technologies 
should be conceived and valued. Intermediate in cost, complexity, and 
sophistication, they would rely on people of intermediate know-how and 
might consequently trade off these attributes by being of intermediate 
usefulness rather than high-tech. Schumacher identified key attributes as 
small scale, small harm, mixed technologies, and design adapted to local 
circumstances. Examples would include small wind generators like those 
used on American farms between the wars, which could be repaired or even 
built from scratch from readily available materials such as wood and wire or 
equivalent power sources harnessing flowing streams.56  
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The characteristics of appropriate technology, as defined by Schumacher 
and others, argue that it is adapted to the needs, skills, and resources of its 
users and environments, and tends to emphasize local autonomy, 
egalitarianism, and sustainability. A technology ideally adapted to its 
environment is one that relies on locally available materials and human 
resources for its design, manufacture, operation, and maintenance. The 
design is required to be environmentally neutral not just for its users but 
holistically for all affected parties. These characteristics, he suggested, can 
serve as goals for guiding wise technological choices.  
First, appropriate technologies support local autonomy and self-
sufficiency by encouraging local expertise in design, production, and repair. 
By avoiding reliance on centralized skills and authority, they consequently 
reduce hierarchies and potential injustices.  
Second, such a locally oriented scale encourages responsive and wise 
innovation. This connection between designers and users crucially 
distinguishes appropriate technology from Weinberg’s notion of the 
technological fix. Operating on a small scale may make designers of 
appropriate technologies, who are likely to be the users themselves, more 
alert to genuine needs and contexts, and to immediate side effects.  
Third, appropriate technologies encourage diversity, identified by both 
Naess and Bookchin as an abstract but valuable principle to be promoted. 
The concept grows from the scientific principle identified by earlier 
ecologists such as Aldo Leopold: species diversity tends to produce more 
resilient ecosystems that can adapt to unexpected perturbations. The idea is 
also compatible with the notion of technological momentum, which argues 
that the ferment of nascent technologies offers more adaptiveness to social 
needs than do mature, large-scale technological systems. There is, though, a 
counterargument against appropriate technologies: by adapting to suit local 
context, they are unlikely to benefit from economies of scale and so may 
prove more expensive to develop and more difficult to maintain consistently.  
Fourth, appropriate technologies are likely to be more sustainable in 
re source usage. By seeking to employ locally sourced materials, they 
encourage clever innovation and adaptation to suit local contexts.  
This principle of having a closed loop system involving production, 
consumption, and recycling was first identified as a basis for maintaining 
sound ecosystems by Aldo Leopold and is the basis of lifecycle assessment 
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discussed in chapter 6. Some of these design considerations are summarized 
in Table 8.1.  
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8.1 Design considerations informed by critiques of technological fixes  
1) Are there implicit assumptions at play? E.g.:  
a) Simplistic identification of the problem (trust in reductionism)  
b) Ease of implementation (unsophisticated planning)  
c) Confidence in likely success (belief in inevitable progress)  
2) Are there identifiable interests (“stakeholders”) with distinct views or 
sensitivities regarding the technology? E.g. particular:  
a) Social groups  
b) Species and ecosystems  
c) Natural environments  
3) Can the technology under consideration be understood as part of a sociotechnical 
system? E.g.:  
a) How are manufacture, usage, and recovery linked to other technologies  
and human systems?  
b) How is the technology linked to existing activities and interests of 
relevant social groups?  
c) How is it linked to wider environments?  
4) Could the technological choice have foreseeable side effects? E.g.:  
a) Technological effects on other parts of the system  
b) Social or cultural implications  
c) Environmental implications  
5) Could the technology be implemented cautiously? E.g.:  
a) Could it be made sensitive to different stakeholders?  
b) Could outcomes be monitored adequately?  
c) Would it permit corrections or reversals if necessary?  
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Slippery Vocabulary and Misleading Practices  
The rhetoric of novelty, exploiting neologisms like “technocracy,” “smart 
cities,” and “transhumanism,” has been influential in shaping cultural 
acceptance of technological fixes. By contrast, the term “appropriate 
technology” has declined in usage since its peak in the early 1980s. It became 
increasingly associated with the perceived focus of Ernst Schumacher and 
Richard Meier: less-developed countries. The concept’s relevance and 
implications for modern urban life were difficult to communicate to 
professional engineers and wider publics in the developed world. Labels and 
meanings consequentially have mutated. The term “sustainable technology” 
has grown in popularity since the 1990s to challenge it.57 The word has been 
adopted by companies and policy-makers as often as by grassroots 
environmentalists, sometimes employed as a form of “greenwash” to label 
restricted examples of “sustainability,” as discussed in chapter 6. The 
transition from “appropriate” to “sustainable” arguably diluted the ethical 
demands of wise design.  
A term seeking to recover part of Schumacher’s wider social and 
moral sense of appropriate technology, however, is “responsible innovation.” 
The label has been used since the 1960s but has been adopted more recently 
for inter-governmental planning of research policy and implementation, 
particularly in Europe. A 2013 European Union report, Responsible Research 
and Innovation (RRI), describes responsible innovation as  
The comprehensive approach of proceeding in research and innovation 
in ways that allow all stakeholders that are involved in the processes of 
research and innovation at an early stage (A) to obtain relevant 
knowledge on the consequences of the outcomes of their actions and on 
the range of options open to them and (B) to effectively evaluate both 
outcomes and options in terms of societal needs and moral values and 
(C) to use these considerations (under A and B) as functional 
requirements for design and development of new research, products 
and services.58  
Such definitions appear to place responsibility in the hands of 
designers and funders (particularly government funders), with no overt 
mechanisms for public participation. This direction by technical elites echoes 
the ideas of the Technical Alliance a century ago and of Alvin Weinberg fifty 
years later.  
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The ethical norms and responsibilities are also ill-defined. Seeking 
grounds for negotiation and consensus, the same report suggests that 
“Standards on RRI that can be adopted voluntarily … could include … a shared 
definition of RRI, including principles like orientation towards … gender 
equality, open access, public engagement etc.”59  
By contrast, Schumacher’s focus was on designers, maintainers, and 
communities, and an important feature was the avoidance of hierarchies of 
power and governance. Central direction of technological design and choice, 
he suggested, tends to impose solutions that are not well adapted to local 
circumstances or to weaker parties. A key difference between “responsible 
innovation” and “appropriate technology,” then, is their respective sensitivity 
to “softer” human concerns. Appropriate technology may sometimes promote 
cultural and social traditions rather than business growth, for example; 
responsible innovation, on the other hand, may more often favour the greater 
good over regional concerns.  
Broad adoption of something like the perspectives of appropriate 
technologies or responsible innovation may appear unlikely. The promotion 
of deliberate technological futures by ardent proponents, coupled with our 
collective appetite for novelty and personal benefit, works against more 
cautious and systematic consideration. As suggested by contemporary 
futurology, deeper thinking about sociotechnical systems remains 
uncommon. Among the key aspects identified in the historical cases 
examined in this book are the under-appreciated frequency – even regularity 
– of unintended consequences; the poverty of adequate design consideration 
of such side effects; and, the inherently political dimensions of technological 
choice. For a century, the trend in technological fixes and consequent side 
effects has been their scaling up, thereby increasing the vulnerability of 
regional and even global environments. The interdisciplinary teams studying 
anthropogenic climate change label it a “wicked problem,” in the sense of not 
being amenable to solution by a single discipline or approach.60 This growing 
consensus surrounding the human problems associated with climate change 
suggests that technological fixes, when they work at all, address problems 
only at relatively modest scale and in the short term.  
As I have sought to show, the history and momentum of technological 
faith is unsettling. On the one hand, modern culture has become primed to 
expect and welcome new technological solutions and to disregard critical 
assessment until they have been widely adopted and found wanting. On the 
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other hand, local incidents have made publics painfully aware of unplanned 
side effects of specific technologies.  
The most consistent thread through this century-long history of 
technological hubris is the enduring role of rhetoric. Verbal persuasion and 
imagery have been tools to legitimize optimistic expectations that rely on 
inadequate evidence or extravagant claims. As the technocrats employed 
them, speeches in the form of simple tales won over audiences. Early science 
fiction and popular science magazines portrayed escapist adventures and 
uncritical futures provided by sage designers. Weinberg’s essays and 
speeches introduced similarly evocative (and evasive) examples. 
Contemporary entrepreneurs and technological adventurers carry on the 
tradition. Just as importantly, graphic illustrations have reiterated the 
rhetoric of technological solutions for our social world, from the technocratic 
postcards to lurid covers of Popular Mechanix, to mid-century corporate 
advertising and contemporary online media promoting nanotechnology, 
smart cities, and geoengineering quests. Recognizing the potency of such 
imagery, I have anticipated reader predilections by avoiding pictures of side 
effects (e.g., waste dumps or sea life strangled by plastic), likely to be 
interpreted as partisan or polemical, in favour of the unrealistic promises of 
positive human futures. My aim has nevertheless been to communicate the 
faith-like nature of such technological assurances: the brief parables, 
sermons, and catechisms on which they were based; the modern zealots 
proselytizing the planned utopian future; evangelists for miraculous 
technological cures; and the liturgies of modern public discourse. At the heart 
of the analogy is the nature of faith itself: the quality of unreasoning trust 
detached from understanding or justification. The irony is that the history of 
this technological belief has been so poorly supported by rational 
underpinnings.  
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